The history of war and peacekeeping has little to say about languages or the people who work with them, yet a closer inspection shows that contacts between different languages and the presence of an interpreter were a routine experience during the peacekeeping and peace-building operations conducted by the UN and NATO in Bosnia-Herzegovina. interactions were also encounters between languages. They could rarely be accomplished without at least one interlocutor resorting to a language which was not his or her mother tongue or alternatively without the involvement of an interpreter or translator.
The United Nations (UN) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) to safeguard humanitarian aid convoys and protect the UN safe areas during the war (1992-95), then implement and uphold the Dayton peace agreement which laid out BiH's post-war settlement, required a multi-national assortment of soldiers and civilian defence staff to encounter a place of which they mostly knew little and forced the remaining inhabitants of BiH to encounter them.
Indeed, the activities of 'peacekeeping' comprised a multitude of intercultural encounters not only between the peacekeepers and the local civilian and military populations but also between the soldiers from more than 30 different national and military cultures who worked together at headquarters, in logistics or engineering projects, on weapons inspections and in combined training exercises. Most intercultural interactions were also encounters between languages. They could rarely be accomplished without at least one interlocutor resorting to a language which was not his or her mother tongue or alternatively without the involvement of an interpreter or translator.
Studies of the interpreter in war and international relations concentrate on interpreters' privileged access to power-holders and their capacity to control the transmission of information. Some historians have also begun to investigate the military and diplomatic uses of languages during the First World War, when area experts and native speakers were employed to produce propaganda, 1 and in the Ottoman Empire, where a corps of long-term resident dragomans in Constantinople produced political and commercial news, intelligence and knowledge for the Ottoman court, the foreign diplomats they served and the multi-generational dragoman families to which they often belonged. 2 However, most historical works about conflict interpreters concern the Second World War or after, reflecting the professionalization of interpreting after the trials of German war criminals.
To date, the emphasis in studies of Second World War interpreters has either been on court interpreting, as at the Nuremberg trials, 3 or on intelligence work. 4 Roger Dingman,
for instance, has shown that US forces struggled to recruit trustworthy interpreters for the Pacific theatre amid the national paranoia about Japanese-Americans. The cadre of white military linguists, Dingman argues, had to overcome their socialization as combat soldiers earmarked to fight the Japanese enemy in order to build on the methods of their language training and develop an empathy with the civilians that troops encountered and interned. 5 Meanwhile, Navajo and Comanche men were famously recruited as 'code talkers' in order to outwit Japanese interception of radio signals in theatre. 6 Trust and origin were as problematic in Australia as in the US: Australian military linguists also served in the Pacific theatre, but those with immigrant backgrounds experienced discrimination and were unable to take posts open only to commissioned officers. 7 For the period after 1945, several memoirs by interpreters who worked for eastern bloc leaders during the Cold War were published in the West as insights into the thoughtprocesses of personalities such as Stalin, Gomułka and Gorbachev. 8 A small number of linguist memoirs have also emerged from the war in Iraq. 9 In published accounts of the peacekeeping operations in BiH, the figure of the interpreter is usually on the margins. Usually, interpreters are the occasion for a story about the devastation of the area in which the memoirist served, the destruction of pre- Recent scholarship on the war in BiH encourages us to see it as a multi-dimensional set of local conflicts which intersected with the strategic objectives of the major armies involved and to recognize that the image of an essentialist ethno-religious war was consciously disseminated by elites who benefited from a continuation of hostilities.
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However, the prevailing public representation of the Bosnian conflict in the states which contributed troops to the peacekeeping effort was of a long-standing antagonism between three clearly-defined groups, the Bosnian Croats (Catholic), the Bosnian Serbs (Orthodox) and the Bosnian Muslims (Muslim; the alternative term 'Bosniaks' is also used to distinguish ethnic and religious identity). To talk about three sides or factions is somewhat simplistic but reflects the understanding of most peacekeepers 12 -and the reality imposed on Bosnians whether they subscribed to it or not. The situation of interpreters and language contacts in BiH sits at the intersection of matters raised by several disciplines. Recent developments in translation studies, for instance, give sound theoretical reasons for studying formal and informal translation and interpretation -'language contacts' of all kinds -in conflict. Mona Baker has observed that translators and interpreters in conflict situations are always 'firmly embedded in a series of narratives that define who they are and how they act in the world'. Moreover, she argues, they cannot 'escape responsibility for the narratives they elaborate and promote through their translating and interpreting work'. 13 Meanwhile, Michael Cronin has argued for 'a critical translation studies' which would interact with social theory, security studies and globalization research. 14 There is a trend in south-east European area studies towards investigating the relationship between locals and internationals in places such as BiH which have experienced significant inflows of international personnel, capital and ideology as the so-called 'international community' attempts to reshape local social and political relations. 15 The anthropologist Andrew
Gilbert, for example, thus emphasises how OSCE internationals' limited knowledge of the local language in BiH excluded them from critical flows of information and forced them to stake their reputation on the abilities of their local interpreters. 16 Militaries themselves, meanwhile, have begun to give higher-level consideration to the concept of 'operational language support' -how to recruit or employ people with the required knowledge, how to train them and how best for other personnel to work with them.
Drawing on oral history interviews with individuals who were involved with peacekeeping in BiH as part of the British Army or NATO, as well as published UK, US and Dutch sources, this paper outlines how the working lives of local interpreters and linguists from the troop-contributing countries changed as international strategies and local conditions altered in BiH.
Local interpreters

During the war: UNPROFOR (1992-95)
The militaries that contributed to UNPROFOR, which were still largely on a Cold War footing when the Bosnian conflict broke out, contained very few personnel who already spoke the language they had known as 'Serbo-Croat'. Once the peacekeeping forces arrived in BiH, it became apparent that the mission required extensive interaction with the local community as well as the armies involved in the conflict, requiring a high level of language support. The solution was to hire local interpreters for every UNPROFOR office, every military observer team and the bases of the many battalions which formed part of the UN force. The employees were usually teachers or students of foreign languages. Some were professionals in other areas, such as the doctor who worked as an interpreter for the British general Michael Rose (Rose claimed this doctor, a Croat, had been prevented from working at the Sarajevo hospital because of his ethnicity), 17 and a remarkable number were engineering students and/or the children of engineers.
Especially in smaller towns, young people might be hired before they had finished their studies or even secondary school. The successful candidates received payment in hard currency, a job while troops were stationed in their location, and access to necessities in short supply -shelter, protection and food. English, they were interviewed to make sure that they actually could do so and then put through a United Nations testing process (including translation between English and the local language(s) in both directions) so that they could obtain a personnel number and ID card. UNPROFOR required that interpreters were aged 18 years or more and only allowed one member of each family to have a job with the UN -although applicants could circumvent this requirement by answering 'no' in the relevant section of the form.
Interpreters had the legal status of UNPROFOR employees, unlike other locallyhired civilians such as cleaners, mechanics, laundry assistants or kitchen hands. The Dutch battalions stationed in Srebrenica had had to recruit their non-UNPROFOR employees through the local town council ('opština'). The opština attempted to monopolize recruitment for jobs with peacekeepers and NGOs, limited the amount of time one person could be employed with such organizations and preselected candidates for employment, privileging existing residents over refugees who had arrived in Srebrenica and were in even more need of work. 24 UNPROFOR legal status did not exempt interpreters from interference by the local authorities. In 1994, one town's mayor told UN civilian staff that paying the interpreters at the regular UN rate would unbalance the local economy and asked for half their salaries to be paid to the opština so that he could supply the interpreters with food. The UN representatives agreed, to the disgust of officers in the battalion where the interpreters worked. Interpreters from Srebrenica, Goražde and Pale have reported more direct harassment by the local authorities in order to set them up as an intelligence source or to obstruct the peacekeepers. 25 The UN end of the recruitment process for interpreters did not appear well adapted to the realities of the war zone. To obtain an ID card required a photograph, which refugees who had fled with nothing might well not have. One interviewee remembered applicants having to cut their own faces out of precious family photographs and, on one occasion, a civilian clerk melting an interpreter's only photograph in a laminator. The problem was overcome when somebody acquired a Polaroid camera. The translation tests were processed and graded further up the line by United Nations staff, and the grade achieved determined the rate of pay. On occasion, the testing process fell foul of the ethnicized language politics in BiH. If the marker was a Croat, Serbianisms in the text might be marked down, even though they were naturally part of the linguist's idiolect and/or were appropriate for the area in which the linguist would be operating. 26 The officer in charge of interpreters within a battalion was also responsible for equipping them. 1 DWR required every patrol to have an interpreter on the grounds that, without communicating with the locals, the infantry could not perform its primary role of dominating the ground and gathering intelligence. This policy contrasted with the Dutch approach to patrols during the UNPROFOR period, where an interpreter would usually not be taken even on the 'social patrols' which aimed to 'take the pulse' of the civilian population through informal conversations -although by 1999 the Dutch troops in SFOR were 'often' taking an interpreter on social patrols. 27 Given the constant risk of sniper fire while outdoors, obtaining protective equipment for civilian interpreters was a matter of survival. Louise Robbins found she had to negotiate with the battalion quartermaster for flak jackets and helmets and protested that '[y]ou can't send soldiers out with flak jackets on and protection and the interpreters without, 'cause a bullet will go straight through them, you know, it's not fair.' Military clothing reduced the risk of an interpreter being picked out by snipers, but their difference could never be concealed:
with the best will in the world those interpreters were never going to look like soldiers. They didn't walk like soldiers, they didn't do their jacket up, I, I used to tell them every morning, for goodness sake, you want to look like us, do your combat jacket up, do your laces up properly, tuck your, tuck your trousers in, tie your hair back, you're a target. And they didn't carry weapons of course, which was the other obvious giveaway.
Female interpreters tended to stand out even further:
You know, the girls won't tie their hair back into a tight bun, it's not glamorous.
Ultimately, no amount of precautions could be foolproof. For instance, it was not unknown for the breastplates in interpreters' flak jackets to be sold on, even though the battalion inventoried them as expensive 'starred items' and investigated any disappearances.
The understanding of the Bosnian conflict as an ethnic or ethno-religious war -an understanding which the elites of the groups involved in the conflict and the international policy-makers who saw themselves as alleviating or preventing it collaborated to produce -required hiring interpreters from the three different ethnicities in order to liaise with Croat, Serb and Muslim interlocutors. For these purposes, interpreters who had a mixed family background and/or had identified themselves before the war as 'Yugoslav' would find themselves classified into one of three ethnic groups. The practice showed yet another dimension of the 'war on ambiguity which accompanied and legitimated the physical conflict in BiH, but was necessary to ensure the interpreters' safety and also to reassure the military forces they would be liaising with. Louise Robbins quickly learned 'not to send a Bosnian Muslim to the Serb confrontation line to interpret at a meeting, because they […] couldn't interpret because they thought they were going to be shot.' 28 A Bosniak interpreter on the same team did, however, volunteer to accompany a convoy through VRS lines into the Bosniak enclave of Goražde. Guards at a VRS checkpoint refused to let him through because his ID bore an obviously Muslim name, and Robbins 'had to find another volunteer to go, who was of the right ethnicity, right religion.' 29 The risks of encountering the forces which opposed those of one's 'own' ethnicity were manifested during the fall of Srebrenica, when a Bosniak interpreter who had been hired to work inside the enclave accompanied a Dutch UN military observer to a meeting with the VRS's general, Ratko Mladić. Mladić accused him of having been in the (Bosniak) army and alluded to the risk that a VRS soldier might go mad and shoot him, at which the interpreter fled. In Potočari, where one Dutch company was based, Mladić later confronted another interpreter who had in fact fought against the VRS and threatened to shoot any more Bosniak interpreters sent to him by the Dutch. 30 Interpreters' fears of encountering the opposing army were not immediately assuaged by the peace agreement. A US newspaper reporter recalled that in 1996, shortly after the arrival of IFOR, he and the female Bosniak interpreter who worked for him drove up to a point on the Inter-Ethnic Boundary Line where there had been a VRS checkpoint a few days before:
[S]he gripped the steering wheel and she looked at us and she said, you would bring me this close? And I said, oh no no no, they're gone. And she wasn't even listening, she was furious, and she was shaking. And all of a sudden you began to know what they meant by rape is a weapon. And… and she didn't talk to us the rest of the way back to Tuzla, and we had to promise her that we would never take her close to Serbs again. 31 Stories such as this illustrate the difficulties in achieving one of the main and unfulfilled goals of the 'international community', the return of refugees to areas where they had been or would be an ethnic minority. Working as an interpreter could enable one to partially detach oneself from participating in violence. Simultaneously, it could provide a way of directly supporting a particular group in the conflict. The Dutch battalions at Srebrenica widely suspected that certain interpreters also worked as informants for the Bosniak army (ABiH) -but despite these security fears interpreters and local women employed as cleaners still had access to the battalion and company operations room, where they were able to observe timetables, rosters, a logbook, an outgoing mailbag and a waste-paper bin full of envelopes with the return addresses of soldiers' family members (evidently, the risk was not judged sufficient for soldiers to be tasked as cleaners). 34 In Croatia, some Croats who responded to the European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM) advertisement for translators did so because they themselves wanted to present the Croatian side of the war to the international monitors for whom they were translating the experiences of victims and refugees. In practice, however, they found that they could not reconcile the 'positions of the witness and the translator' and had either to adopt the professional subjectivity of neutrality or the witness's subjectivity of testimony. 
Interpreters from troop-contributing nations
Michael Cronin's distinction between 'autonomous' and 'heteronomous' methods of recruiting interpreters in a colonial context has already been applied to ex-Yugoslavia by Mia Dragović-Drouet. In an autonomous system, 'colonizers train their own subjects in the language or languages of the colonized', whereas in a heteronomous system local interpreters were taught 'the imperial language' instead. 45 One may, of course, dispute whether the colonial comparison is appropriate (and it is beyond the scope of this article to engage with Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin's controversial critique of the international administration in BiH as an analogue of the British Raj in India 46 ), yet the distinction between recruitment systems reminds the historian that either choice would introduce certain skill sets, conceptual frameworks and loyalties into the interpretation process. Since so few people in the UNPROFOR troop-contributing nations spoke the languages used in BiH, in practice most interpreter recruitment was heteronomous. 47 However, the peacekeeping forces did also train some of their own personnel to speak the languages as well as sending heritage speakers to BiH. the plight of… military interpreters is, we get, not literally, but parachuted in.
We get plucked out of our wherever we are, our education centres or whatever we're, job we're doing, and dumped in a whole environment with people that we've never met before […] they already had their friendships, their protocols, and here we were, these odd people who had different cap badges […] And at the end of the operation you're parachuted or airlifted back out, plonked back in your education centre, never to see any of these people again. And so you can't say, um, oh do you remember when we got shot at, do you remember when we were ambushed, it doesn't happen.
[…] you get dumped in and then you get dumped out again. 55 Judging by the information in the Srebrenica report, British battalions were better equipped with military interpreters than were their Dutch counterparts. The first Dutch battalion, which arrived in 1994, only acquired a military interpreter after its commanding officer had found that, with only Bosniak interpreters available inside the enclave, he could not make contact with the VRS. An army interpreter, Paul Lindgreen, was duly sent from the Netherlands and was able to assist the designated liaison officer as well as to interpret in a narrow sense. After returning, he also prepared a lessonslearned report on interpretation and cultural training. In Srebrenica, however, the level of direct language support from the Dutch army declined after Lindgreen's departure.
His replacement in the second battalion, 'a Dutch solder who spoke Serbo-Croat and could interpret', was not quite so experienced, while the commander of the third and last Dutch battalion had apparently tried and failed to have a military interpreter sent at all. 56 The Dutch army admittedly had fewer troop commitments in BiH than the British and had nothing like so many high-ranking officers at headquarters who required language support. Even at the battalion level, however, the Dutch approach to peacekeeping which minimized contact with the local population went hand in hand with a lower requirement for interpreters. The third Dutch battalion had four interpreters, 57 whereas the Cheshires had employed 15 and 1 DWR, a year later, had had 41.
Troop numbers surged when IFOR arrived in BiH in December 1995 but were then reduced to below UNPROFOR levels from late 1996 onwards as IFOR changed to SFOR. This reduced troop-contributing nations' commitments as a whole but not necessarily the need for military interpreters. Since many contributing armies had been involved in BiH for several years, they had rather more 'military colloquial speakers' of the local language(s) than they had had at the start of the operation and could sometimes use them to supplement or replace local interpreters in tasks such as liaison visits. 58 Thus Captain Paul Sulyok, a liaison officer with 2 LI, had already been trained in 'Serbo-Croat'. He had served a tour in Goražde in 1994-95 and was able to contribute to the battalion's pre-deployment training for platoon commanders. 59 Although after Dayton personal safety considerations far less often precluded the use of a local civilian interpreter, security restrictions still imposed a need for some linguists to be recruited from outside BiH (also a potential problem in public service interpreting).
Local nationals could not get security clearances because they were not citizens of an SFOR country and were all in a sense considered to come from one of the Bosnian 'factions'. Indeed, SFOR was therefore unable to provide linguistic support for any There is a need for a common language capability among units deployed on missions. This is essential to both the execution of the mission and the day-today administration of deployed forces.
[…] With regard to local language capability, access to competent interpreters and translators is required as an integral part of the mission, since it may not be possible, or desirable, to rely entirely on locally-recruited staff for these roles. If he speaks English and we employ him, his wage will be multiplied by at least three. On one hand he will increase his consumption, but on the other, he will pull someone useful out off [sic] the school. And that is only one example.
Therefore we have to find a balance. 68 According to Robert Barry, the US diplomat who led the Organization for Security and 'peacekeeping space' which confirmed their identities as combat-capable masculine soldiers and discouraged them from contact with locals, who were presumed hostile.
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Lawrence Venuti has argued that the frequent 'invisibility' of the translator reflects 'a complacency in […] relations with cultural others'. 73 To directly ask about linguists in peacekeeping, in an interview or as the objective of a research project itself, can prompt a respondent to make new conceptual connections, bring out information which had been taken for granted and mark out a field of knowledge as it goes along.
